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WHERE DO DEAD CORPORATIONS LIVE?:
DETERMINING THE CITIZENSHIP OF INACTIVE
CORPORATIONS FOR DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
PURPOSES
INTRODUCTION
Recently, there has been much debate regarding the con-
tinued viability of diversity jurisdiction' in the modern era.2
However, since it appears that diversity jurisdiction will not be
abolished anytime in the near future,3 all disputes concerning
the applicability of diversity rules must be resolved in accor-
dance with present constitutional and congressional require-
ments.
1 Diversity jurisdiction is grounded in Article M, § 2 of the United States
Constitution which provides that judicial Power shall extend... to Controversies
between Citizens of different States. Moreover, Congress has authorized district
courts to hear cases involving citizens of different states if the amount in contro-
versy requirement contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) is satisfied. Thus, the district
courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the matter in contro-
versy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000 and is between citizens of different
states.
2 See, e.g., William A- Braverman, Janus Was Not a God of Justice: Realign-
ment of Parties in Diversity Jurisdiction, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 1084 n.56 (1993)
("there is simply no analogy between today's situation and that existing in 1789
when there was a real need for diversity jurisdiction) (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141 (1973)). One suggestion for revising
the current diversity requirements is to limit the applicability of diversity jurisdic-
tion to complex multi-state litigation, interpleader actions and suits involving
aliens. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COuR
STUDY COM ITrEE 38-42 (1990). More modest changes include: (1) prohibiting
plaintiffs from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states; (2) deeming cor-
porations to be citizens of every state in which they are licensed to do business;
(3) excluding attorney's fees, punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering
from the amount in controversy; and (4) raising the jurisdictional amount to
$75,000. See id.
See Braverman, supra note 2, at 1092 (stating that although Congress has
been willing to regulate diversity jurisdiction at the margins, it has resisted at-
tempts to eliminate it altogether).
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As the law stands today, both natural born persons and
corporations (artificial persons) are citizens of at least one
state for diversity jurisdiction purposes.4 Natural persons are
citizens of the state where they are domiciled, and corporations
are citizens of the states where they are incorporated. Further-
more, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) provides that a corporation shall also
be deemed a citizen of any state where it has its principal
place of business. Therefore, for many corporations a dual
citizenship is created because a corporation will be a citizen of
both the state of its incorporation and the state of its principal
place of business. Although there are different tests used to
determine the principal place of business site,' it is generally
agreed that a corporation can only have one principal place of
business."
Several recent diversity cases involving defunct or inac-
tive7 corporations have sparked debate over (1) whether a cor-
poration must have a principal place of business for diversity
purposes, and, if so, (2) how that place is to be determined.
The main issue in these cases is how to determine the citizen-
ship of a corporation which is inactive at the time a diversity
suit is commenced. Should the state of incorporation be the
4 28 U.S.C § 1332(a), (c) (1994).
See, e.g., Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (creating a "nerve center" test which considers the site of executive
and administrative functions in determining the corporation's principal place of
business); cf Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960) (cre-
ating a "bulk of activities" test which emphasizes the corporation's center of pro-
duction or service activities).
6 See, e.g., U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. DiMassa, 561 F. Supp. 348 (E.D.
Pa. 1983), affd, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Associated Press, 223 F.
Supp. 151 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ("The use of the terms 'State' and 'its' in the amended
Act-both terms used in the singular-indicates that one principal place of busi-
ness was intended. If more than one place were contemplated, would not places
have been used?"); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 13B FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3624, at 611 (2d ed. 1984) ("Section 1332(c) clearly requires
that every corporation must have one-but only one-principal place of business").
" The terms inactive and defunct are used interchangeably in this Note, as
well as in the overwhelming majority of the relevant case law. Generally, the
terms refer to a corporation which had been conducting business activities in a
state, but subsequently ceased all active business conduct in that state. A small
minority of cases does distinguish the two terms by using the word defunct to
refer to the type of corporation described above, while reserving the term inactive
for a corporation which has been granted a charter in a state but has not yet
commenced business. See, e.g., Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D.
Pa. 1973). For a detailed explanation of the term "inactive," see infra pp. 673-76.
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sole determinant since an inactive corporation cannot have a
place of business? Or should a defunct corporation's last prin-
cipal place of business, as well as the state of incorporation,
determine its citizenship?
In addition to several district courts,' three United States
courts of appeals have considered this issue and reached dif-
ferent conclusions. The Second Circuit determined that an
inactive corporation's last principal place of business is always
determinative of its citizenship,9 while the Third Circuit held
that an inactive corporation cannot possibly have any principal
place of business when it does not conduct any business activi-
ties.10 Somewhere in the middle of the continuum is the Fifth
Circuit, which has held that an inactive corporation's principal
place of business is relevant, but not dispositive, in determin-
ing its citizenship." The majority of district courts addressing
the issue is in accord with the Second Circuit approach.2
This Note argues that in order to effectuate the true pur-
pose of the federal diversity statute and to prevent abuse of
the federal judicial system, an inactive corporation's last prin-
cipal place of business must be a determinative factor in ascer-
taining its citizenship for diversity purposes. Part I of this
Note briefly discusses the history of diversity jurisdiction,
focusing on the congressional intent and reasons for adopting
the diversity rule. Part II analyzes the inactive corporation and
the problems that arise when such an entity is involved in
' See, eg., Paper Corp. of United States v. Benedetto, No. 91 Civ. 8376, 1993
WL 378341 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1993); China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. One Pass,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038 (N.D. Cal. 1993); China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. Allendale
Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Comtec, Inc. v. National Tech-
nical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ariz. 1989); Interpetrol Bermuda, Ltd. v.
Rosenwasser, No. 86 Civ. 5631, 1987 WL 7734 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1937); Puerto
Rico Maritime Shipping Auth. v. Star Lines, No. 78 Civ. 602 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22,
1978) (opinion and order): But see Bogner v. Ace Forms, Inc., No. CIV.A.88-2170-S,
1988 WL 135145 (D. Kan. Nov. 23, 1988); Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
' Wnm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d
131 (2d Cir.), affd, 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991).
10 Midlantic NatN1 Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693 (3d Cir.), cerL dismisscd, 116
S. Ct. 32 (1995).
" Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992).
1' See, e.g., Paper Corp., 1993 WL 378341; One Pass, 812 F. Supp. 1303;
Allendale, 818 F. Supp. 1301; Comtec, 711 F. Supp. 522; Interpetrol, 1937 WL
7734; Star Lines, No. 78 Civ. 602. But see Bogner, 1988 WL 135145; Gauin, 356 F.
Supp. 483.
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potential diversity litigation. This Part also examines the dif-
ferent approaches of the only three United States courts of
appeals that have addressed this problem. Finally, Part III
compares the various circuit courts' approaches and concludes
that the Second Circuit approach best comports with the ratio-
nale for diversity jurisdiction and prevents misuse of the feder-
al system.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF DIvERsITY JURISDICTION
A. The Early Years-The Constitutional and Pre-1958 Attitude
Towards Diversity
The framers of the United States Constitution granted the
federal judiciary diversity jurisdiction in order to create a neu-
tral forum to protect foreign (out-of-state) litigants from the
inherent prejudices of the local state courts."3 The framers,
guided by their desire to preserve the peace of the union, de-
signed this mechanism to reduce disharmony between citizens
of the different states. 4 As James Madison explained, "It may
happen that a strong prejudice may arise in some states,
against the citizens of others [so that] ... [a] citizen of another
state might not ... get justice in a state court." 5 Diversity
jurisdiction, it was argued, would reduce the friction between
citizens of the different states by providing a neutral forum to
litigate their disputes, thereby achieving national harmony and
unity among the states. 6 Consequently, judicial interpreta-
13 See Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883) ("the very object of giving
to the national courts jurisdiction . . . in controversies between citizens of different
states was to institute independent tribunals, which . . . would be unaffected by
local prejudices and sectional views ... ."); see also J.A_ Olson Co. v. Winona, 818
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1987); Asher v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 249 F. Supp. 671
(N.D. Cal. 1965); S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N 8102 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 18301; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, §
3601.
*' See Bravernan, supra note 2, at 1079.
15 Speech of James Madison, June 20, 1788, in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1414 (John P. Kaminsky & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1993).
"6 See Motion of Edmund Randolph and James Madison, June 13, 1787, in 1
REcORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 22, 223-24 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Re-
vised 1937).
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tions of diversity rules should be consistent with this strong
policy of protecting the foreign litigant from local prejudices.
Diversity jurisdiction was also created to encourage inter-
state commerce and investment.' The framers hoped that
diversity jurisdiction would provide the nation's merchants
with security concerning the contracts they made in foreign
states.18 In fact, both scholars and legislators have argued
that no other single element in our governmental system has
done as much to promote the development of enterprises as the
existence of federal courts sitting in diversity cases. 9
B. Post-1958-Abuse and the Modern Trend Toward Limiting
Diversity Jurisdiction
In 1958, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332, so that a
corporation is deemed a citizen of "any state by which it has
been incorporated and of the state where it has its principal
place of business."0 The legislative history behind the 1958
amendment provides much insight into the reasons for its
adoption and the expected results of its implementation. Two
main objectives dominated the amendment's adoption. First,
the amendment was designed to ease the workload of the fed-
eral courts.2' If a corporation is a citizen of both its state of
incorporation and principal place of business, the likelihood
that complete diversity exists between the parties is dimin-
ished. As a result, the number of diversity cases heard by the
federal courts is reduced.
Second, the amendment attempted to remedy the abuse
created by entirely local corporations invoking diversity juris-
17 Braverman, supra note 2, at 1078, 1081-82.
* Speech of James Wilson, Dec. 7, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY OF THE RATIFICA-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION 519 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1982).
19 S. REP. NO. 1830, supra note 13, at 3119; see William H. Taft, Possible and
Needed lReforms in Administration of Justice in Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601,
604 (1922).
20 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958). The amendment also increased the amount in
controversy to $10,000 to help reduce the workload of the federal courts sitting in
diversity jurisdiction. Moreover, in 1988 Congress further restricted the number of
diversity cases by increasing the jurisdictional amount to the current amount of
$50,000.
21 See generally S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13; see also WRIGHT LT AL, su-
pra note 6, § 3624.
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diction. 22 In essence, the pre-1958 statute gave "rise to the
evil whereby a local institution, engaged in a local business
and in many cases locally owned," was able to litigate in the
federal courts simply because it had obtained a charter from
another state.' Similarly, local plaintiffs were abusing the
diversity rule by dragging entirely local corporations into feder-
al court.' Therefore, by amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to include
a corporation's principal place of business to determine its citi-
zenship, Congress purported to preclude what were in fact
local entities from suing, or being sued by, local citizens in fed-
eral court simply because they were chartered in a different
state. 5
In fact, the Senate committee that proposed the 1958
amendment found that 62% of all diversity cases involved
corporations as parties.26 More significant, however, is the
1951 Report of the Committee on Jurisdiction and Venue sta-
tistic demonstrating that 57.3% of all diversity cases contained
a non-resident corporation doing business in the local state.27
This second statistic firmly corroborates the assertion that
prior to the 1958 amendment the authority to invoke diversity
jurisdiction was being abused, particularly in cases involving
local corporations chartered in foreign states.
Moreover, the Senate report underlying the new amend-
ment emphasized that diversity jurisdiction was meant to
"provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against prej-
udices of local courts and local juries."' Furthermore, diversi-
ty jurisdiction "was never intended to extend to local corpora-
tions which, because of a legal fiction, [could be] considered
22 See generally S. REP. NO. 1830, supra note 13; see also WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 6, § 3624.
" S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3101-02; see Black and White Taxicab
and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928).
" See generally S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13; see also WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 6, § 3624.
25 Midlantic Natl Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 n.7 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE % 0.77[3.-4] (2d ed. 1996));
Canton v. Angelina Casualty Co., 279 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1960); see MANUAL FED-
ERAL PRACTICE § 1.25 (4th ed. 1991).
"' S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3100.
27 S. REP. NO. 1830, supra note 13, at 3111.
28 S. REP. NO. 1830, supra note 13, at 3102.
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citizens of another state." ' The "fiction" the report referred to
was the "stamping" of a corporation as a citizen of its state of
incorporation only, regardless of where a majority of the
corporation's activity occurred."0 The pre-1958 diversity stat-
ute permitted this type of legal fiction. Therefore, the main
concern of the amendment was to remedy this evil by limiting
the circumstances under which a corporation could sue or be
sued in federal court.
Although the Senate committee was attempting to limit
diversity jurisdiction, it was not urging that diversity jurisdic-
tion be abolished altogether. In fact, the Senate report empha-
sized a bulk of expert opinions which indicated that local prej-
udice continues to exist despite the existence of the highly
integrated society in which we live." Moreover, the Senate
committee proclaimed that diversity jurisdiction is "essential to
the proper administration of justice under the system of dual
sovereignty established by [the] Constitution."' In essence, it
is a way of maintaining the proper balance between the au-
thority of the individual states and that of the federal govern-
ment. Thus, Congress' position when it amended 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c) in 1958 was that diversity jurisdiction remain an inte-
gral part of the judicial system while litigants' abuse of its
protections be eliminated.'
Contrary to the manifest reasons for the amendments
adoption, how the amendment would be implemented is some-
what less obvious from its legislative history. One original
committee proposal suggested that a corporation be deemed a
citizen of its state of incorporation and of any state from which
it derived more than half its gross income.' A second propos-
al suggested that a corporation be deemed a citizen of its state
S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 310L
S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3101-02.
" S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3116-17; see Charles L. Brieant, Diversi-
ty Jurisdiction: Why Does the Bar Talk One Way But Vote the Other Way With Its
Feet?, 60 N.Y.S.B.J. 20, 21 (1989) ("anyone who believes that there is no local
chauvinism in the state courts is hiding his head somewhere').
S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3116.
" S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3116.
' 5. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3124; see Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Concerning Diversity of Citizenship, 1957: Hearings on H. 2516 and 4497 Before
Subcom,. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 36
(1957).
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of incorporation and of every state in which it is doing busi-
ness. 5 The committee rejected these two proposals, however,
and instead recommended the "principal place of business"
standard because it was a simpler and more familiar criteria
for courts to apply.36 The committee report indicates that be-
cause the "principal place of business" test of citizenship had
ample precedent in court decisions and in federal statutes,
such as the Bankruptcy Act,37 courts already had "sufficient
criteria to guide [them] in future litigation under [the new]
bill."8 For example, in a bankruptcy proceeding, a bankrupt
corporation's state of incorporation and its last principal place
of business are determinative for diversity jurisdiction purpos-
es. 9 Thus, when Congress passed the 1958 amendment, it
intended for federal courts to interpret "principal place of busi-
ness" in diversity cases as it is interpreted in the Bankruptcy
Code.4"
35 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3624, at 604-05; see also Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts Concerning Diversity of Citizenship, 1957: Hearings on H.R. 2516
and 4497 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1957).
" See Comtec, Inc. v. National Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 523 n.1 (D.
Ariz. 1989).
' For discussion of these provisions and their relation to citizenship of inactive
corporations, see infra pp. 686-87.
S . REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3102.
" Fada of New York, Inc. v. Organization Serv. Co., 125 F.2d 120 (2d Cir.
1942).
40 Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d
131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991); see MANUAL FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 26, § 1.25;
infra pp. 686-87 on Fada case for an explanation of bankruptcy provisions.
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HI. THE UNIQUE PROBLEMS OF INACTIVE CORPORATIONS
INVOLVED IN DIvERSITY JURISDICTION LITIGATION
It is agreed that Congress intended for corporations to
have only one principal place of business,4' despite the possi-
bility that corporations might conduct substantial business
activities in numerous states. However, it is unclear wheth-
er Congress considered the opposite scenario-that an inactive
corporation might not have a principal place of business at
all.' Therefore, when a corporation is inactive at the time a
diversity suit is filed against it, there is an issue as to whether
the corporation has a principal place of business to determine
its citizenship for diversity purposes.
A. Inactive Corporations and the Traditional Tests ofPrincipal
Place of Business
A corporation may be deemed inactive in a state when, at
the time the suit is filed, "only a flicker of corporate activity re-
mains."' This flicker of activity generally refers to the wind-
ing up of old business 5 and precludes affirmative activities
such as the production of goods and services46 and the con-
ducting of any active business.47
4 U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. DiMassa, 561 F. Supp. 348, 351 n8 (E.D. Pa.
1983), affd, 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Associated Press, 223 F. Supp.
151, 154-55 (E.D. Pa. 1963) ("The use of the terms 'State' and 'its' in the amended
Act-both terms used in the singular-indicates that one principal place of busi-
ness was intended. If more than one place were contemplated, would not places
have been used?"); see WRIGHT FT AL., supra note 6, § 3624 ("Section 1332(c) clear-
ly requires that every corporation must have one-but only one-principal place of
business").
Sanders Co. Plumbing and Heating v. B.B. Andersen Constr. Co., 660 F.
Supp. 752, 755 (D. Kan. 1987) ("It appears that Congress recognized but did not
accept the possibility that a corporation would have many offices in many states
at which it transacts a substantial amount of business.. ...
IId. at 754 ("Congress does not appear to have considered the antithe-
sis-that an inactive corporation may have-no principal place of business at all.").
"Kreger v. Ryan Bros., Inc., 308 F. Supp. 727, 729 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
See Comtec, Inc. v. National Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ariz.
1989) ("Comtec ceased its business activity and began 'winding up old business");
Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1973) ("[thel corporation has
ceased all of its business activities, has sold all of its assets and is in the process
of winding up"); Sanders, 660 F. Supp. at 757 ("The [inactive] corporation lived on,
if at all, solely to wind down .... ).
Comtec, 711 F. Supp. at 523 n.3.
' Storr Office Supply v. Radar Business Sys. Raleigh, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 154,
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Several factors, rather than one dispositive element, usual-
ly combine to trigger a corporation's inactive status. For exam-
ple, a corporation is clearly dormant if it has not generated
revenue, has not entered into contracts and has not employed
paid personnel for a period of years.4" Similarly, when a cor-
poration has ceased conducting any active business, has no
substantial assets or liabilities, and has no address, telephone
number or employees, it is inactive.49 Moreover, other indicia
of a corporation's inactive status are the failure to maintain an
office in a state, failure to possess any office equipment or fur-
niture, and failure to make any sales or purchases in the
state.0 Inactivity is also presumed when a corporation has no
business office, no employees, no service personnel and no
other ongoing activities.51 Finally, in addition to becoming
inactive by a voluntary withdrawal from business activity in a
state, a corporation may also be rendered inactive by govern-
ment or administrative action.52
Therefore, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction analysis,
the relevant factors considered in determining whether a cor-
poration is inactive in a particular state are whether the corpo-
ration: (1) has ceased conducting all active and ongoing busi-
ness activities, including entering into contracts or making any
sales or purchases; (2) has any substantial assets or liabilities
in the state; (3) has any employees or pays any wages or sala-
ries; (4) occupies any office space; (5) owns, rents or possesses
any office equipment or furniture; and (6) has an address or
telephone number where it can be reached in the state.
It is not necessary, however, for the corporation and the
state to have absolutely no connection in order for the corpora-
tion to be considered inactive. For example, the failure to can-
cel a corporation's certificate of incorporation53 or to formally
155 (E.D.N.C. 1993).
" Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Rosenwasser, No. 86 Civ. 5631, 1987 WL 7734,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1987).
" Starr Office Supply, 832 F. Supp. at 156.
:0 Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
51 Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1992).
62 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat1 Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 694 (3d Cir.) (holding
that corporation was rendered inactive when the Office of Thrift Supervision and
the Resolution Trust Company seized its holdings forcing it to cease actively en-
gaging in business), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 32 (1995).
' Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Rosenwasser, No. 86 Civ. 5631, 1987 WL 7734,
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dissolve the corporation" will not by itself preclude a
corporation's inactive status. Similarly, listing a state as a
corporation's principal place of business in annual reports and
other documents filed with the government does not defeat a
corporation's inactive status." Moreover, the mere storage of
corporate records," the conduct of a lawsuit,' the mainte-
nance of an agent authorized to receive complaintst or the
ownership of some accounts receivable, 9 standing alone, are
all insufficient to void a corporation's inactive status.
When a corporation is active, however, various courts
employ different tests to determine the site of a corporation's
principal place of business. There are three basic tests. Some
jurisdictions, including New York, apply the "nerve center" test
which defines the principal place of business as the site of
executive and administrative functions.' Other jurisdictions
utilize a "place of activities" test which looks to the
corporation's center of production or service activities in deter-
mning its principal place of business."' Lastly, some jurisdic-
tions use a "total activity test" which first considers the gener-
al rules of the two previous tests in light of the particular cir-
cumstances of a corporation's organization, and then balances
the facts of each case to determine the location of the
corporation's principal place of business.'
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1987) (stating that cancellation of certificate of incorpora-
tion is merely one indication of corporate inactivity).
" Gavin, 356 F. Supp. at 486 (holding that despite corporation's failure to dis-
solve, it was still deemed inactive for principal place of business analysis).
" See, e.g., Harris, 961 F.2d at 550; see also Sanders Co. Plumbing and Heat-
ing v. B.B. Andersen Constr. Co., 660 F. Supp. 752, 754 n. (D. Kan. 1987).
11 See, e.g., Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also "Sanders, 660 F. Supp. at 753
(finding corporation had ceased operations in state despite presence of certain
closed files placed at a rented storage facility).
"See, e.g., Passalacqua, 608 F. Supp. at 1263.
" See, e.g., Gavin, 356 F. Supp. at 486.
"See, e.g., Comtec, Inc. v. National Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522 (D. Ariz.
1989).
"See, e.g., Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
61 See, e.g., Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir.
1960).
0 See, e.g., Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1992); see
also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3625, at 625 (arguing that Scot and Kelly can
simply be viewed as applications of the rule that the bulk of corporate activity
governs the choice of principal place of business) (cited in Harris, 961 F.2d at 549
1996]
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These traditional tests for determining a corporation's
principal place of business do not offer much assistance when
confronted with an inactive corporation.' This is so because
there are no factors to use to establish an inactive
corporation's principal place of business. There are no business
activities, no employees and no office. If a principal place of
business can be established for a corporation using the tradi-
tional tests, this means that the corporation has enough con-
nections with the state to be deemed active in that state.
Thus, determining the principal place of business of an
inactive corporation differs from doing so for an active corpora-
tion. While the traditional tests can be used to determine the
principal place of business of the corporation while it was ac-
tive, once the corporation is inactive a further analysis is nec-
essary. A court must decide whether the previous determina-
tion of the principal place of business will stand, or whether
the previous determination is void because the factors upon
which it was based (e.g., place of activities or nerve center) no
longer exist. The appellate courts are split on this second part
of the analysis.
B. The Circuit Split on the Relevance of Last Principal Place of
Business
Only three United States courts of appeals have addressed
the issue of the citizenship of an inactive corporation. Each
court, relying on congressional intent and plain meaning inter-
pretations of the federal diversity statute, has reached a differ-
ent result.
1. The Second Circuit Approach: Last Principal Place of
Business Always Considered
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of an inactive
corporation's citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdic-
tion in Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers
South, Inc.' Win. Passalacqua Builders ("Passalacqua"), a
n.5).
' See Gavin v. Read Corp., 356 F. Supp. 483, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
64 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991).
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building contractor, contracted with Resnick Developers South
("Developers") to build a hotel in Florida.' Passalacqua was
incorporated in Ohio and qualified to do business in Florida,
while Developers was incorporated in Florida." Passalacqua
sought arbitration to resolve disputes over the price of extra
work needed to complete the contract. The arbitrator entered a
final judgment against DevelopersY After Developers had
satisfied approximately half of the judgment, Passalacqua
brought suit against Developers in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York.' At the time
suit was filed, Passalacqua was an inactive corporation whose
last business activity was in Florida.6
Developers challenged the district court's subject matter
jurisdiction by arguing that Passalacqua's principal place of
business when the suit commenced was Florida, its last princi-
pal place of business.70 Therefore, since both Passalacqua and
Developers were citizens of Florida, complete diversity was
lacking. Passalacqua, on the other hand, argued that it did not
have a principal place of business because it was inactive at
the time suit was filed."' Thus, Passalacqua argued it was a
citizen only of Ohio, its place of incorporation, and since
Developers was a citizen of Florida only, complete diversity
existed.72
The district court held that although Passalacqua was an
inactive corporation at the time the suit was brought, it was
still a citizen of Florida, its last principal place of business.73
The court based its holding upon the decision in Puerto Rico
Maritime Shipping Authority v. Star Lines 4 which held that
the principal place of business for a corporation that is inactive
at the time suit is filed is the state of the corporation's last
business activity. Thus, since Developers was incorporated in,
6' Id. at 133.
6 Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 1261, 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 933 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1991).
1 Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 133-34.
r" Id. at 134.
Passalacqua, 608 F. Supp. at 1263.
70 Id.
71 Id.
7' Id.
73 Id. at 1263-64.
7' No. 78 Civ. 602 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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and therefore was a citizen of, Florida, Passalacqua was a non-
diverse plaintiff.v5 Furthermore, because Passalacqua was an
indispensable party to one count of the complaint, its absence
from the action required the dismissal of the entire count.75
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
interpretation that when a corporation has ceased business
activity, diversity jurisdiction is determined by the
corporation's state of incorporation and by the place it last
transacted business.7 The appellate court, relying on notions
of congressional intent, argued:
To allow inactive corporations to avoid inquiry into where they were
last active would give them a benefit Congress never intended for
them, since under such a rule a defunct corporation, no matter how
local in character, could remove the case to federal court based on
its state of incorporation. 8
A rule that the corporation's last principal place of opera-
tion is dispositive of its citizenship precludes inherently local
corporations from invoking diversity jurisdiction simply on the
basis of their state of incorporation.
Moreover, the appellate court compared the diversity stat-
ute79 to the federal bankruptcy laws in effect at the time.8"
This comparison, the court noted, is particularly instructive
because Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) in 1958 to
follow the provisions of the bankruptcy laws.8 The Bankrupt-
cy Code grants lower courts jurisdiction over a bankrupt corpo-
ration either in its place of domicile or in its principal place of
7 Passalacqua, 608 F. Supp. at 1261.
'6 Id. at 1263-64. The first two counts of the complaint were for equitable
relief seeking to pierce the corporate veil, since Developers was among several
corporate entities controlled entirely by members of the Resnick family. The third
count was for fraud, and the fourth count alleged an oral guarantee by one of the
defendants to pay the sum owed. The fraud count was the one dismissed because
Passalacqua was indispensable. However, since Passalacqua was not indispensable
to the resolution of the remaining claims against defendants, FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b)
did not require the entire complaint to be dismissed. Wm. Passalacqua Builders,
Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991).
" Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141.
78 Id.
79 28 U.S.C § 1332(c) (1988).
" Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141.
81 See S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3102; see also Jack H. Friedenthal,
New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REv. 213, 222-25 (1959);
supra pp. 670-71.
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business."2 The appellate court then referred to Fada of New
York, Inc. v. Organization Service Co.,' which authorized a
New York district court's jurisdiction over a bankrupt corpora-
tion even though New York had not been its place of business
for at least six months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.' Thus, since the new diversity laws were modeled
after the bankruptcy provisions, the court concluded that is-
sues concerning citizenship for diversity purposes should be
decided according to the same standards as those established
for bankruptcy matters.'
In sum, the Second Circuit's approach is that when a cor-
poration has ceased business activities in a state at the time
suit is brought, its citizenship for diversity jurisdiction, similar
to bankruptcy jurisdiction, is determined by both the state of
incorporation and the last principal place of business.'
2. The Third Circuit Approach: Last Principal Place of
Business Never Considered
The Third Circuit considered the issue of inactive corpora-
tions and diversity in Midlantic National Bank v. Hansen.
Midlantic National Bank ("Midlantic"), a national banking
association with its principal place of business in New Jersey,
made several loans to Elmer and Eileen Hansen, the joint
owners of all stock of Hansen Bancorp, Inc. ("Br), a corpora-
tion organized under the laws of Delaware.' HBI used some
of these funds to finance the purchase of two savings and loan
associations, one in Florida and one in New Jersey.' In Janu-
ary of 1992, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Resolution
Trust Corporation seized control of the Hansens' New Jersey
' S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13; see Friedenthal, supra note 81, at 222-25.
" 125 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1942).
, Id at 121.
Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d
131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991).
SId.
48 F.3d 693 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct 32 (1995) (certiorari was
dismissed upon request of the parties pursuant to Rule 46.1 of the United States
Supreme Court Rules).
Id. at 694.
~'Id.
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thrifts.' The seizure rendered HBI inactive because HBI was
a holding company and when all of its holdings were seized, it
was forced to cease actively engaging in business."'
Six months later Midlantic brought a collection suit
against HBI for defaulting on several of the loans in the New
Jersey district court based on diversity jurisdiction.92
Midlantic argued that it was diverse from HBI because HBI
was not active in New Jersey, Midlantic's principal place of
business, at the time the suit was brought.9" Therefore, HBI
was a citizen of Delaware only, its state of incorporation. 4
HBI challenged the federal jurisdiction, contending that its
principal place of business at the time the suit was brought
was indeed New Jersey, even though it had been inactive for
six months prior to the commencement of the suit. 5
As evidence of HBI's New Jersey citizenship, the Hansens
claimed that at the beginning of 1991 HBI moved its head-
quarters from Pennsylvania to New Jersey." In addition, in
an affidavit submitted to the district court, HBI's chairperson
of the board and chief executive officer alleged that: (1) in 1991
HBI transferred all its books and records, including all ac-
counting and financial records, to New Jersey; (2) in early 1991
all employees of HBI were terminated or transferred to posi-
tions with the New Jersey subsidiary; (3) from the beginning of
1991 HBrs chief executive officer's office was located in New
Jersey; and (4) from early 1991 substantially all of the account-
ing, financial, corporate and legal activities were conducted
from HBI's headquarters in New Jersey. 7
The Hansens argued that the five months between HBI's
cessation of business activities and the filing of the complaint
"did not ... dissipate HBI's local character for diversity pur-
poses." 98 Therefore, the Hansens argued that since HBI's last
principal place of business was New Jersey, and that since
'0 Id. at 695.
91 Id. at 695 n.2.
Hansen, 48 F.3d at 695.
" Id. at 694.
Id.
's Id. at 696.
" Id. at 696 n.3.
Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696 n.3.
98 Id. at 696.
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Midlantic's principal place of business was also New Jersey,
complete diversity did not exist. 9 The district court was not
persuaded by the Hansens' reasoning and denied their motion
to dismiss the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."'
On appeal, the Third Circuit held that, for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction, an inactive corporation is a citizen of its
state of incorporation only.'' The appellate court relied
heavily on the rule that diversity jurisdiction is determined by
examining the citizenship of the parties at the time the com-
plaint is filed. 2 The court began its discussion by stressing
the fact that HBI was an inactive corporation at the time the
complaint was filed.' 3 Furthermore, the court emphasized
that "corporate activities" determine a corporation's principal
place of business.' T This implies that a corporation without
corporate activities, by definition, has no principal place of
business. 5 The court went on to conclude:
Inasmuch as we consider the actual business activities of the corpo-
ration to be determinative of the corporation's principal place of
business, we conclude that as a general matter, an "inactive" corpo-
ration (that is, a corporation conducting no business activities) has
no principal place of business, and is instead a citizen of its state of
incorporation only."0
Thus, the court held that since HBI was inactive at the time
Midlantic filed suit, HBI could not have any principal place of
business and was, therefore, only a citizen of its state of incor-
poration, Delaware. 7
The Third Circuit did acknowledge, however, that its hold-
ing conflicted with those reached by the Second and Fifth Cir-
cuits.' 8 Particularly, the Third Circuit responded to the Sec-
so I&.
1* Id. at 695.
01 Id. at 696.
102 Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696 (stating that jurisdiction is tested by the facts as
they exist when the action is brought) (citing Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 93
n.1 (1957)).
10 Id.
"I Id. (citing Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir.
1960)).
10 Id
105 Id
'- Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696.
109 Id at 696-97.
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ond Circuit's concern that a local corporation may subvert
Congress' intent in enacting the principal place of business
provision.' The Third Circuit noted that by amending 28
U.S.C. § 1332, Congress purported to preclude what was in
fact a local entity from suing, or being sued by, a local citizen
in federal court simply because it was chartered in another
state."' Nevertheless, the Third Circuit determined that the
benefits of certainty and clarity that are obtained from its
"bright line" rule outweigh the potential harm identified by the
Second Circuit."' The Third Circuit also acknowledged the
Second Circuit's reliance upon Congress' structuring of the
1958 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to follow the provisions
of the bankruptcy laws."' The Third Circuit reasoned, how-
ever, that while Congress did originally instruct courts to look
to bankruptcy precedent for guidance in interpreting the
amended diversity statute, there had been emerging a set of
separate principles and criteria for making the jurisdictional
determination over the previous three decades."'
In addition, the Third Circuit admitted that its opinion
conflicted with the majority of the district courts."4 Like the
Second Circuit, most lower federal courts have held that an
inactive corporation is a citizen of both its state of incorpora-
tion and of its last principal place of business."5 These dis-
trict courts support their position with a plain meaning argu-
ment. They rely on Congress' inclusion of the conjunction "and"
when it amended the diversity statute to include a
corporation's principal place of business as a determinant of
citizenship."6 Section 1332(c) expressly states that a corpora-
" Id. at 698.
110 Id. at 698 n.7 (quoting JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.77[3.-4] (2d ed. 1996)).
... Id. at 698.
" Hansen, 48 F.3d at 697 n.5.
113 Id. (citing JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.7713.-l
(2d ed. 1996)).
.. Id. at 697.
m" See, e.g., China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. One Pass, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038,
1040 (N.D. Cal. 1993); China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818
F. Supp. 1301, 1304-05 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Comtec, Inc. v. National Technical Sch.,
711 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D. Ariz. 1989).
10 28 U.S.C § 1332(c)(1) (1994) ("a corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any
state by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its princi-
pal place of business") (emphasis added).
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tion is a citizen of its state of incorporation and its principal
place of business. By using the word "and," Congress could not
have meant that a corporation's citizenship would be its princi-
pal place of business or its state of incorporation."1
The Third Circuit rejected this plain meaning argument,
claiming that it did not believe Congress' use of the conjunc-
tion "and" signifies its intention for courts to strain to locate a
principal place of business when no such place exists. s In
fact, the Third Circuit reasoned that had Congress intended for
the principal place of business to determine a corporation's
citizenship, Congress could have easily crafted the statute to
read that a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it "has
or has had" its principal place of business." Thus, the Third
Circuit rejected the notion that the statute implicitly requires
all corporations to have a principal place of business.'
3. The Fifth Circuit Approach: Last Principal Place of
Business Considered on Case By Case Basis
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of the inactive
corporation's citizenship for diversity in Harris v. Black
Clawson Co." Harris was injured in an industrial accident
while working at the Manville Forest Products Corporation's
Louisiana plant.' He was severely burned when steam was
accidentally injected into a concrete machine he had been
working on as part of a maintenance team.' The other two
members of the team were killed in the accident.' Harris,
together with the representatives of the other men, brought
suit in Louisiana state court. The defendants removed the case
to the United States District Court for the Western District of
117 AUendale, 818 F. Supp. at 1304-05; see Comfec, 711 F. Supp. at 524 (stating
that [b]y using the conjunction 'and,' Congress intended for all of the require-
ments of the statute to be fulffilled").
" Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698.
119 I&L
961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 548-49.
1Id.
IdIc
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Louisiana." The plaintiffs were then given leave to add an-
other two defendants, one of which was Ford, Bacon and Davis
Construction Company ("FB & DCC").12 6
At the time the suit was filed, FB & DCC had been inac-
tive in Louisiana for over five years. 27 It had no business of-
fice, no employees and no other ongoing business activities in
Louisiana.' After adding FB & DCC, plaintiffs moved to re-
mand the case to the state court.'29 Plaintiffs argued that FB
& DCC was a citizen of Louisiana because Louisiana was its
last principal place of business. Therefore, because all the
plaintiffs were also Louisiana citizens, complete diversity was
destroyed.' The plaintiffs maintained that despite its inac-
tive status, FB & DCC was still a citizen of Louisiana because
while inactive it represented in its annual reports and other
documents filed with the Louisiana Secretary of State that its
principal place of business was Louisiana.'3'
The Harris district court rejected this argument stating
that such reports and filings were not dispositive for diversity
jurisdiction purposes." 2 The district court then provided ex-
amples of other contexts where representations to government
agencies, such as the Secretary of State or the Securities and
Exchange Commission, are not binding for purposes of diversi-
ty jurisdiction."3 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs'
subject matter jurisdiction challenge and granted summary
judgment for the defendants on the ground that plaintiffs'
claims were barred by the Louisiana Statute of Repose."
1 Id.
2 Harris, 961 F.2d at 549.
'2 Id. at 550 n.6.
12 Id. at 550.
Id. at 549.
no Id.
131 Harris, 961 F.2d at 550.
132 Id.
' See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83, 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding
that statements made to Securities and Exchange Commission are not binding for
diversity jurisdiction); Gautreau v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 255 F. Supp. 615, 616
n.1 (E.D. La. 1966) (holding that statements made to Secretary of State are not
binding for diversity jurisdiction).
'3 Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (1991) precludes any
suit based on the allegedly defective "design . . . or construction of an improve-
ment to immovable property" from being brought more than ten years after the
completion of work performed).
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Rather than adopt a bright line test similar to either the
Second or Third Circuit, the Fifth Circuit adopted a more flexi-
ble approach regarding an inactive corporation's citizenship.
On appeal from the Harris district court, the Fifth Circuit held
that although an inactive corporation's last place of business is
not dispositive, it is relevant to a determination of its citizen-
ship for diversity purposes.' Moreover, the Fifth Circuit
held that the amount of time that has elapsed between the
corporation's cessation of business activities and the com-
mencement of the suit should determine the relevance of its
last place of business in a diversity jurisdiction analysis.'
Thus, as a matter of law, where a corporation has been inac-
tive for a substantial period of time, then that state is not the
principal place of business.' 7 However, if the corporation has
been inactive for a short period of time, then its last principal
place of business will be relevant in determining its citizenship
for diversity purposes. The Fifth Circuit noted that questions
of substantiality must be decided on a case-by-case basis.'
The Fifth Circuit concluded that because FB & DCC had
been inactive in Louisiana for over five years prior to the filing
of the suit, a substantial amount of time,' Louisiana was
not its principal place of business. Therefore, complete diversi-
ty existed between the parties.' The appellate court found it
unnecessary to determine whether a corporation is required by
28 U.S.C. § 1332 to have a principal place of business 41 be-
cause all of the plaintiffs were citizens of Louisiana and as
long as defendant was not a citizen of Louisiana, complete
diversity existed.'4
SId.
* Id.; see Midlantic NaVl Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 697 (3d Cir.) (discuss-
ing the approach of the Fifth Circuit in Harris, 961 F.2d at 551.
Harris, 961 F.2d at 551.
Id. at 551 n.10.
Id. at 551.
140 Id.
*" Cf. Midlantic Nat!l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir.) (-We reject
the notion that implicit in the statute's terms is the requirement that al corpora-
tions be deemed to have a principal place of business."), cert. dismisscd, 116 S. CL
32 (1995).
11 Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 n.12.
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III. A COMPARISON OF THE THREE APPROACHES
Determining which of the three approaches to the diversity
issue is the best requires a thorough analysis of the federal
diversity statute.' The strict construction, plain meaning
and legislative history prongs of such an analysis all point to
the superiority of the Second Circuit approach.'"
A. Strict Construction Analysis
Traditionally, the federal diversity statute is strictly con-
strued." 5 Therefore, any doubts should be resolved against
finding jurisdiction. 4" The Second Circuit's approach is most
in accord with this principle because it reduces the frequency
of finding diversity jurisdiction. By looking at the inactive
corporation's state of incorporation and its last principal place
of business, corporations are more likely to be citizens of two
different states. This increases the probability that complete
diversity will not exist between the parties to a suit.
In contrast, the Third Circuit approach expands the proba-
bility that diversity jurisdiction will be found. By looking only
at an inactive corporation's state of incorporation, the Third
'4 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
14 At least one commentator agrees that it would be feasible and desirable for
the courts to hold that no principal place of business exists for a corporation in
certain situations. See Friedenthal, supra note 81, at 213, 224 (pointing out that
even the members of the judicial conference that proposed the amendment admit-
ted that in some situations it might not be possible to identify a principal place of
business). This position appears to be in accord with the Third and Fifth Circuit
approaches. However, this author is referring to situations where corporate enter-
prises are go widely dispersed geographically that there are too many places which
could serve as a principal place of business. See, e.g., Kelly v. United States Steel
Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 853 (1960) (stating that the concept of principal place of busi-
ness may get artificial in some cases, like the one at bar, where the corporation
had fourteen divisions of the parent corporation and eleven principal subordinate
companies, in addition to the fact that company's manufacturing activities were
spread practically all over the U.S. and extended to foreign countries). In contrast,
when dealing with a defunct corporation in a diversity case, the issue is not how
to determine the principal place of business among a multitude of choices, but
rather whether such a place actually exists. Therefore, since the inquiries are
different, it is not imperative that the same rule apply in both situations.
" Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1983); see
China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. One Pass, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038 (N.D. Cal.
1993).
"a Kantor, 704 F.2d at 1092; see One Pass, 812 F. Supp. 1038.
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Circuit precludes a corporation's citizenship in the state of its
principal place of business if it is different from the state of
incorporation. Thus, the likelihood that the parties will be
diverse is increased because the corporation is only a citizen of
one state.
The Fifth Circuit approach restricts jurisdiction more than
that of the Third Circuit because it allows an inactive
corporation's last principal place of business to be considered
when the corporation has been inactive for an insignificant
period of time. Nevertheless, it still does not foreclose as many
possibilities as the Second Circuit.
B. Plain Meaning Analysis
The Second Circuit approach is also supported by a plain
meaning interpretation of the statute. First, 28 U.S.C § 1332(c)
expressly states that a corporation is a citizen of both its state
of incorporation and its principal place of business. The clear
majority of district courts, which utilizes a plain meaning ra-
tionale, agrees that the use of the conjunction "and" implies
that Congress intended for both of the requirements of the
statute to be fulfilled before diversity jurisdiction will at-
tach.'47 As such, any conclusion that an inactive corporation
has no principal place of business ignores a key element which
is a prerequisite to diversity jurisdiction."4 Second, when
Congress .used the conjunction "and," it could not have meant
that a corporation's citizenship would be based on its state of
147 See, e.g., One Pass, 812 F. Supp. at 1040 ([Tihe use of the conjunction 'and'
implies that Congress intended all elements to be met before diversity jurisdiction
will attach."); China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F.
Supp. 1301, 1305 (N.D. CaL 1992) ("[Tjhrough the use of the conjunction 'and,
Congress could not have meant that a corporation's citizenship would be its princi-
pal place of business or its state of incorporation... ."); Comtec, Inc. v. National
Technical Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 524 (D. Ariz. 1989) (uBy using the conjunction
'and,' Congress intended for all of the requirements of the statute to be fulfilled.5;
New Hampshire Auto. Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 620 F. Supp.
1150, 1157 (D.N.L 1985) (stating that use of conjunction 'and" requires all ele-
ments to be present), modified, 801 F.2d 528 (1986).
11 Comtec, 711 F. Supp. at 525.
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incorporation or its principal place of business."" If Congress
intended such a result, it would have expressly used the word
"or" and not the word "and" in the statute.15
Thus, the statute contains the implicit assumption that all
corporations have a principal place of business.' Moreover,
since there is nothing in Section 1332 to suggest that a
corporation's principal place of business should be ignored once
that corporation becomes inactive, a plain reading of the stat-
ute requires a court to utilize the corporation's last principal
place of business in determining its citizenship.5 2 The Sec-
ond Circuit approach is the only view consistent with these
conclusions because the Second Circuit demands that an inac-
tive corporation's last principal place of business always be
determinative of its citizenship. This, of course, implies that all
corporations must have a principal place of business for diver-
sity purposes.
The Third Circuit rejects the plain meaning interpretation
by arguing that Congress' use of the conjunction "and" does not
signify that it intended for the courts to strain to locate a prin-
cipal place of business when no such place exists."5 The
Third Circuit stresses that Congress provided that a corpora-
tion should be deemed a citizen of the state in which it has its
principal place of business. Thus, if Congress truly wanted an
inactive corporation's last principal place of business to be
determinative of its citizenship, the Third Circuit argues, it
could have easily done so by providing that a corporation be
deemed a citizen of the state where it "has or has had" its
principal place of business.M
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit view still prevails be-
cause Congress clearly worded the statute to require consid-
eration of the state of incorporation and the principal place of
business. By using the word "and," as opposed to "or," there
was no need for Congress to include the words "has had" to the
14 Allendale, 818 F. Supp. at 1305.
150 Id.
.. Comtec, 711 F. Supp. at 524; Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv.
Inc., 220 F. Supp. 490, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
15. Allendale, 818 F. Supp. at 1305.
1' Midlantic Natl Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
116 S. Ct. 32 (1995).
154 Id.
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statute. Furthermore, the Second Circuit approach does not re-
quire a court to strain to find a principal place of business, as
the Third Circuit contends, because the inactive corporation's
last principal place of business can easily be ascertained by use
of traditional tests used for active corporations.' The Second
Circuit approach does not attempt to find a principal place of
business based on the current activities of the corporation, but
rather on factors present when the corporation was active.
In addition, although the Fifth Circuit did not address the
use of the word "and," its position is inconsistent with the
plain meaning interpretation. This is so because the Fifth
Circuit interpretation allows for the last principal place of
business to be ignored when the corporation has been inactive
for a substantial period of time, thus allowing for one of the
required elements to be overlooked.
C. Legislative History Analysis
The Second Circuit approach is also most in accord with
the legislative history supporting the 1958 amendment which
added a consideration of the principal place of business to 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Congress' intent in adding the principal place of
business requirement was to preclude federal courts sitting in
diversity from hearing actions between corporations that are
local in nature. 6
In essence, Congress did not want federal jurisdiction in-
voked in localities where corporations had local ties.' This
is because diversity jurisdiction was created to allow foreign
litigants to avoid local prejudice in state courts by providing
them with a neutral federal forum." However, because there
is no threat of prejudice or favoritism when a corporation has
its principal place of business in the same state in which its
adversary is a citizen, the protection of a federal forum is un-
necessary.'59 Consequently, an inactive corporation, by virtue
15 See supra pp. 673-74.
' Hughes v. United Engineers & Constructors, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 895, 897-98
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
' China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. One Pass, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038, 1040
(N.D. Cal. 1993); see supra pp. 666-71 for discussion of legislative history.
'" See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 US. 99, 111-12 (1945).
15 Interpetrol Bermuda, Ltd. v. Rosenwasser, No. 86 Civ. 5631, 1987 WL 7734,
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of having engaged in its business operations in a state which
was its last principal place of business, has established a con-
nection with the state and, therefore, is not subject to the risks
of being an "alien" in the state."°
Moreover, the same reasoning applies even if a corporation
has been inactive in a state for a long period of time. While the
corporation was active it received the benefits of conducting
business in the state. Therefore, the corporation should not be
able to escape scrutiny for acts which took place while it was
active in the state. Furthermore, such a corporation is unlikely
to face greater prejudice merely because it has been inactive in
the state for a long period of time. A small local corporation
which conducted business mainly within the state will still be
considered "local" once it becomes inactive. Such a corporation
is not a foreign or alien company and, therefore, does not re-
quire the protection of diversity jurisdiction. Similarly, the bias
against a large interstate corporation is unlikely to increase
merely because the corporation has been inactive in the forum
state for a long period of time. This is because the prejudice
against corporations is often unrelated to their "foreignness"
but, rather, is caused by their economic "bigness."61
The Second Circuit approach is most consistent with the
legislative history because it requires courts always to look at
the inactive corporation's last principal place of business to
determine its citizenship for diversity purposes. In this way,
local corporations are precluded from suing or being sued in
federal court based solely on their states of incorporation. This
is precisely the type of situation Congress was trying to pre-
vent when it amended Section 1332.162
The Third Circuit has acknowledged that its approach may
subvert Congress' intent in amending Section 1 3 3 2 ,1ca but it
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
" China Basin Properties, Ltd. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp. 1301,
1304 (N.D. Cal. 1992); see One Pass, 812 F. Supp. at 1040 ("[A] corporation,
which, when active, had its principal place of business in California, is unlikely to
suffer local prejudice in California state courts. Thus, the policy behind the cre-
ation of diversity jurisdiction does not apply in this case.").
... See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 6, § 3624.
162 See S. REP. NO. 1830, supra note 13, at 3101-02; 104 CONG. REC. 12,683-85
(1958).
1" Midlantic Natl Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed,
116 S. Ct. 32 (1995).
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stated that the certainty and clarity which are obtained from
its "bright line" test outweigh the harm identified by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Passalacqua.1" The Third Circuit's reasoning,
however, fails to consider that the Second Circuit approach
also creates a "bright line" test because it always considers the
inactive corporation's state of incorporation and its last princi-
pal place of business. Thus, since the Second Circuit's ap-
proach is both consistent with the legislative history and pro-
vides certainty and clarity, it is the more useful approach.
The Fifth Circuit chose to adopt a more flexible approach
based on its belief that the Second Circuit approach has the
potential to find an inactive corporation's principal place of
business to be a state where it would never have found it to be
when it was active." The Fifth Circuit rationale is premised
on its interpretation of the Second Circuit's holding in
Passalacqua that the place where a corporation was "last ac-
tive" is determinative of its citizenship."6 Thus, according to
the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the Second Circuit approach
deems an inactive corporation a citizen of a state where it
merely transacted its last business activity, regardless of
whether, prior to the corporation becoming inactive, it engaged
in enough corporate activity in that state to make that state
the corporation's principal place of business.
This conclusion is inconsistent with a more faithful read-
ing of the Second Circuit's holding in Passalacqua. First, the
"last active" language to which the Fifth Circuit refers imme-
diately follows the Second Circuit's enunciation in Passalacqua
of the rule that a court should consider both the state of incor-
poration and the principal place of business in deciding wheth-
er diversity jurisdiction is present." This illustrates that
when the Second Circuit referred to the place where the corpo-
ration was last active or last transacted business, it was refer-
ring to the corporation's last principal place of business and
not merely the place where it last transacted any business
activity.
16 Id
1" Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992).
1"5 Id. (discussing Win. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developars South,
Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991)).
167 Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141.
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Second, the Fifth Circuit ignores the Passalacqua language
describing the rationale for the court's holding. Passalacqua
stated that if courts were to allow inactive corporations to
avoid inquiry into where they were last active, then a defunct
corporation, no matter how local in character, could remove a
case to federal court based on its state of incorporation.'
The Second Circuit concern centers on local corporations being
able to sue or be sued in federal court. Thus, it is unlikely that
a corporation whose activities were insufficient to make a state
the corporation's principal place of business while it was ac-
tive, would be deemed a "local" corporation by the Second Cir-
cuit. Consequently, since the Second Circuit is concerned about
local corporations, it could not have meant that any place
where a corporation last transacted business would be its prin-
cipal place of business.
Third, the Fifth Circuit ignores the fact that the Second
Circuit held that Passalacqua was a citizen of Florida because
there was evidence supporting the conclusion that Florida was
Passalacqua's last principal place of business when it was
active."6 9 This supports the assertion, contrary to the Fifth
Circuit's belief, that the Second Circuit will deem an inactive
corporation a citizen of the state which was its last principal
place of business, and not a citizen of any place where it last
transacted any business.
The Second Circuit approach is also consistent with the
second goal of the 1958 amendment which was to ease the
workload of the federal courts sitting in diversity.17 By ap-
plying a rule that an inactive corporation is always a citizen of
its state of incorporation and its last principal place of busi-
ness, the Second Circuit is increasing the odds that two parties
will not be completely diverse from one another. This reduces
the possibility of diversity jurisdiction being found, and thereby
reduces the workload of the federal courts. In contrast, the
Third Circuit test allows for greater diversity jurisdiction be-
cause it only looks at the state of incorporation. This increases
the chances that a corporation will be diverse from other par-
168 Id.
169 Id.
.70 See generally S. REP. NO. 1830, supra note 13; see also WRIGHT ET AL., su-
pra note 6, § 3624.
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ties in the litigation. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit test only al-
lows for the last principal place of business to be used if the
corporation has been inactive for an insubstantial period of
time, and even in such cases the last principal place of busi-
ness is not dispositive of citizenship, but is only a relevant
factor to be considered.
CONCLUSION
Diversity jurisdiction continues to be a volatile topic in the
legal community. Most of the debate centers around the contin-
ued viability of such jurisdiction in the modem era. 1 More
specifically, diversity jurisdiction ties up the resources of the
federal system when federal courts must hear cases involving
essentially local entities. 72 Diversity cases involving inactive
corporations litigating in states where they were formerly
active is a typical example of this situation.
In order to preserve the integrity of diversity jurisdiction,
courts should attempt to limit the scope of its applicability to
situations where its protections are essential for the proper
administration of justice. Thus, as the Second Circuit has rea-
soned, an inactive corporation's last principal place of business
should always be determinative of its citizenship for diversity
purposes. Such a corporation should not avoid scrutiny, nor
should it be precluded from seeking judicial relief, in the court
of the state where it conducted significant activities while it
was active. Moreover, the Second Circuit's approach of using
both the inactive corporation's state of incorporation and its
last principal place of business to determine citizenship for
17 See, e.g., Braverman, supra note 2, at 1084 n.56 (Vthere is simply no analogy
between today's situation and that existing in 1789" when there was a real need
for diversity jurisdiction) (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A
GENERAL VIEW 141 (1973)). One suggestion for revising the current diversity re-
quirements is to limit the applicability of diversity jurisdiction to complex multi-
state litigation, interpleader actions and suits involving aliens. See JUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 2, at 38-42. More modest changes include: (i)
prohibiting plaintif from invoking diversity jurisdiction in their home states; (ii)
deeming corporations to be citizens of every state in which they are licensed to do
business; (iii) excluding attorney's fees, punitive damages and damages for pain
and suffering from the amount in controversy, and (iv) raising the jurisdictional
amount to $75,000. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE US., supr note 2, at 38-
42.172 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1830, supra note 13, at 3101-02, 3111-12.
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diversity purposes best comports with the plain meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 1332, with the legislative history of the constitutional
grant of diversity jurisdiction and with the goals and purposes
of the 1958 amendment to Section 1332.
Dawn Levy
